Chapter 1: The Meeting and Hoodwinked by the White House

It was never entirely clear why I’d been asked to attend a meeting in the White House Situation Room. The invitation had come directly from the new President’s Chief of Staff, John Sununu, a detail that only deepened the mystery. I sat quietly, listening as the others recounted the chain of events that had led to the invasion. Their voices moved through the room like a slow tide, detailing timelines, decisions, and missed signals. I took it all in; the buildup, the intelligence failures, and the official response that had taken shape before the first attacks began.

An Army Major stepped forward to deliver a brief overview of Saddam Hussein’s military capabilities. Using a PowerPoint presentation, he projected a stark graphical comparison of the opposing forces onto the screen. Saddam commanded the fourth-largest standing army in the world at the close of the Iran-Iraq War, nearly one million active soldiers, backed by another 650,000 reservists. His arsenal was staggering: close to 5,000 tanks, 500 combat aircraft, and 250 combat helicopters.

Kuwait, by contrast, fielded a far smaller force, its military little more than symbolic, with a handful of armored vehicles and aging American aircraft. The imbalance was undeniable. There was no real contest; the Iraqi army simply swept across the border, overwhelming the outmatched Kuwaiti defenders in a matter of hours.

The next presenter, also armed with a PowerPoint file, offered an overview of U.S. policy in the Gulf region dating back to 1984. The previous President had grown increasingly concerned that the ongoing war, now in its sixth year, might spill over into neighboring countries. Such an escalation risked destabilizing the entire region and disrupting the global oil supply.

A special task force, chaired by the current President, was formed in response. Its conclusion was sobering; Saudi Arabia and other Persian Gulf states were at serious risk of being drawn into the conflict. The United States had few safeguards in place to protect the oil lifelines essential to both American and European economies at the time. Oil prices could surge overnight if the war spread, potentially triggering economic collapse across the West.

A preventive strategy was devised to counter the threat; build a strategic petroleum reserve. The U.S., by stockpiling a surplus of oil, could release emergency supplies as needed, maintaining the flow and stabilizing markets. The goal was simple but critical, avoid supply shocks that could cripple the economy.

The CIA analyst delivering the next briefing fortunately spared us another PowerPoint file. He spoke plainly, relying on substance over slides. U.S. intelligence had been tracking Iraqi troop movements well before the invasion of Kuwait. The information was relayed to the State Department, and the President had been kept closely informed as the situation in the Middle East grew more volatile.

The U.S. Ambassador to Iraq directly confronted Saddam Hussein in the days leading up to the invasion. Saddam, cool and resolute, denied any intention of attacking Kuwait. The U.S., uncertain of his next move, adopted a cautious wait-and-see approach.

It didn’t take long for the truth to catch up. The study our group had completed nearly two years earlier, along with several prior assessments, proved to be chillingly accurate. Saddam had been preparing for this all along. The invasion wasn’t a reaction; it was a plan long in the making. He had simply waited for the right moment to strike.

This invasion wasn’t some impulsive move if Saddam was acting in line with what we had long suspected, it was part of a broader strategy. His objectives were clear; seize Kuwait’s vast oil reserves, erase Iraq’s crippling debt to its neighbor, and cement his position as a dominant force in the region.

I never believed that Iraq would simply pack up and leave because the United States expressed its disapproval. It would take far more than diplomatic pressure. A serious military response would be necessary, likely a coalition assembled from multiple nations with the will and resources to confront him head-on, for Saddam to be forced out.

This wouldn’t be a minor skirmish. Saddam commanded the fourth-largest army in the world. Dislodging it from Kuwait wouldn’t be swift, and it wouldn’t be easy. It would demand a massive, sustained military effort.

“What are your thoughts on this situation, Dr. Mercer?”, a certain cabinet member asked, his tone dipped in condescension, a smirk tugging at the corner of his mouth. The question wasn’t a genuine invitation, it was a performance aimed at scoring a moment of discomfort at my expense. I immediately recognized him. He was one of the same officials who had made my life miserable during the scramble to assemble the Russian nuclear inspection teams, more interested in optics and turf battles than in the work itself.

Hoping to save face and to offer a clear, reasoned answer that might pull me out of the hole my own impatience had dug, I said, “I’m really not a military strategist. I’m just a numbers guy, someone who looks for patterns and lets logic guide the way. My team anticipated something very much like what unfolded tonight two years ago. Saddam Hussein commands a battle-hardened army, arguably one of the most formidable in the world. Removing him from Kuwait won’t be a matter of quick maneuvers or empty threats.” I paused, carefully choosing my words.