Does anybody have any idea how much manpower and how difficult it would be to search all ships and cargo containers that arrive in all U.S. ports - searching for terrorist-related materials, such as small nuclear bombs or biological agents?
Does anybody have any idea how much manpower and how difficult it would be to search all ships and cargo containers that arrive in all U.S. ports - searching for terrorist-related materials, such as small nuclear bombs or biological agents?
https://www.cbp.gov/border-security/ports-entry/cargo-security
Each year, more than 11 million maritime containers arrive at our seaports. At land borders, another 11 million arrive by truck and 2.7 million by rail.
So 24.7 million containers / year = 67,671 containers per day.
Now, how thoroughly do you want each container searched. That will tell you how many man hours to search each container. From there you can do the math.
To take the math a little further.
Let's say you use .5 man hours / container.
To inspect 67,671 containers per day will require 33,835.5 man hours per day.
Assuming you avoid daily overtime, 1 person = 8 man hours / day.
So you need 4,230 people to inspect 67,671 containers in a day.
Of course containers are coming in 7 days a week and without getting into overtime pay each person only works 40 man hours per week.
67,671 containers times 7 days a week = 473,697
473,697 containers * .5 man hours = 236,848.5
236,848.5 man hours / 40 man hours per person per week = 5,921 people
You forgot nobody works 52 weeks a year.
You are overtly optimistic by assuming .5 hours / container.
Even opening each container takes a few minutes. Depending what you are looking for, you may have to unload the container to verify the contraband isn't stored behind and under other goods.
Trained dogs may help to sniff some items. AFAIK, to find both narcotics and explosives you need usually two dogs...
HM.
ETA: If there are machines in the container you may have to remove covers to see what's really inside.
If it's a containerized tank to hold fluids, how to check what's hidden below the surface of the fluid?
You are overtly optimistic by assuming .5 hours / container.
It wasn't intended to be a realistic assumption. Simply a starting point to carry through and show the math that's needed to get to a number of people required.
Actually, I rather doubt that CPB is even that through in searching containers on average. I doubt that they search every single container, so the time averaged over the entire population of containers is probably well under 15 minutes.
Actually, I rather doubt that CPB is even that through in searching containers on average. I doubt that they search every single container, so the time averaged over the entire population of containers is probably well under 15 minutes
I don't have hard numbers, but my guess is only one out of 500 or 1000 containers is thoroughly searched by customs. The number may be higher in less frequented ports but even less than one out of thousand in major ports like Los Angeles, Long Beach, New York, Rotterdam, Antwerp, Hamburg.
I hadn't thought only one port in the UK made it in the list of the 50 busiest container ports worldwide: Felixstowe
HM.
Let's say you use .5 man hours / container.[/quote}
Which is very optimistic. That person probably needs at least this time to reach the container in question and open it. And you need more than one person to search a container. Maybe even heavy equipment to partially unload it.
A casual check for customs purposes takes two people one to two hours, according to a TV show I saw.
For a more thorough check, they called in two more people and dug through a suspicious container for a day.
My estimate is three people, two hours per container, so I'd up this from 0.5 to 6.0 man-hours for a reasonable search.236,848.5 man hours / 40 man hours per person per week = 5,921 people
I up this estimate to about 70,000 people - who have to know what they are doing, wherever you would get them.
I up this estimate to about 70,000 people - who have to know what they are doing, wherever you would get them.
1. Once again, what I did there wasn't meant to be an accurate estimate. I pulled a number for MH/container out of my ass to walk through the math required to get to the final answer of a specific number of people.
2. Don't just pull an final number out of your ass. How did you get there?
So 24.7 million containers / year = 67,671 containers per day.
This is a leapyear so the number of containers per day is slighly lower.
So 24.7 million containers / year = 67,671 containers per day.
Now, how thoroughly do you want each container searched. That will tell you how many man hours to search each container. From there you can do the math.
Most of those containers are either 48 foot or 53 foot containers. (Or trailers in their own right)
I can tell you from my trucking experience most of the freight I moved across the US/Mexico border was never even looked at. Although I did have a couple loads that set off radiation alarms coming back into the US.
There were occasional loads where my unlucky number came up and they did more than simply stamp the paperwork. More generally, my experience was that the Canadians were more aggressive about inspecting incoming freight than the Americans are. Of course, the Americans love to x-ray their incoming freight, while most Canadian entry ports don't even have scanners available, but I did some getting installed before I stopped driving.
When the Canadians did inspect a load, a typical inspection on a 53foot trailer(and the tractor pulling it) would take about 3 to 4 hours, sometimes longer depending on how many items(Small/varied) are in the cargo. Oh, and they'd bill the company for the hours they spent inspecting it.
My experience with US Customs is on the few times they did inspect, they'd break the seal, look inside, sometimes they'd get inside the trailer and look around, but then they'd come back out and seal it back up.
Of course, you have canines that may or may not be present(never saw one enter a trailer, but never saw one "alert" on a trailer either), and a multitude of sensors they're also using to examine the contents as well often before they decide to open anything up.
I can tell you from my trucking experience most of the freight I moved across the US/Mexico border was never even looked at.
The OP's question wasn't about whether or not every container was being searched now. The question was how much manpower would be required to do it.
Once you've decided how thoroughly you want to search each container, you can determine how many man hours will be required to search 1 container to that standard. From there the rest is just math.
Once you've decided how thoroughly you want to search each container, you can determine how many man hours will be required to search 1 container to that standard. From there the rest is just math.
Unless you're dealing with large/bulky items, I'd say minimum thorough search time frame would be a minimum of 4 hours per container, as you would need to unload it, inspect it, and then load it back into the trailer. Even when the Canadians were unloading my trailers, I never saw them open any of the boxes. Which ironically, is something US Customs DID do on a load of whiskey I brought back from Canada on one trip, but that was due to controls on Alcohol.
The officer walked into the trailer from the dock, picked a case at random, opened it up and pulled out a bottle to verify it matched the manifest. He put it back, of course. :)
I'd say minimum [i]thorough[/i] search time frame would be a minimum of 4 hours per container
Sure, if you are looking for any and all possible contraband.
It will be different if the purpose of searching every container is to looking for something specific, particularly if it's something that emits a detectable radiation signature.
Depending on your scenario it might be worth considering that containers arriving by sea are not usually searched at the time of unloading, they are usually searched at the point they leave the docks. Given the content you suggest is in your container, it could conceivably be set to 'go off' whilst still in the port and still be in range of the adjacent (port) city.
In fact contaminating etc a major port would probably cause greater long term damage than flattening part of a city. Not only would all cargo in transit be 'lost' but sending all goods and ships to alternate ports would likely cause chaos and major delays that would affect a large part of the country.
Just a thought.
For manual searches, there probably aren't enough people. The biological part can come in thumb sized vials and buried among other things in the container.
Nuclear is much easier. Nuetron, gamma, etc scanners, Z scanners, Tomography/CR realtime, ad nauseam, it's not as easy as some believe to slip in a nuke or nuclear materials. It would be much easier for them to get their hands on radioactive materials that are already in the host country. The why of that I won't post.
Chemical gases are problematic for size. The containers for them tend to be recognizable. They would be easier to slip in than a nuke, but not by much as many of the methods that would find a nuke, would find them as well (Z scanners, RTCR etc.). Chemical weapons that come in the form of powders are the major threat there. Other illegal powders come in all the time, it wouldn't take much to substitute a bio or chem weapon in that same supply chain.
For all the above, searching ships are problematic, but doable. The production of the search equipment and training for it would take a ~18 or so month lead time to make that 100%. At the moment, it's all risk and sampling based.
The probability of any of that being slipped in from a port is low. It's much more likely to come across an uncontrolled portion of the border than a port.
Summarizing; manual 100% search of all freight and ships isn't going to happen for any so called first world nation.
Remote and remote assisted exams would have to increase equipment and personnel several fold. The exact increase percent couldn't be determined without some research and data, but I know enough to know it would be minimum of 10x. Doable, but extremely costly.
ETA: One thing to remember, there are the IACS company surveyors. They play a major role in securing containerized shipping. Bureau Veritas, Germanischer Lloyds, etc, are often used to survey and seal the contents prior to shipping. Any container found to have a broken seal is almost guaranteed to be searched closely.
I know you were asking about hours and manpower to search every container, but as far as I understand it, nearly all containers(each one has its own individual number), after they have been packed by an accredited company, have a seal placed on the locks by a certified rep from the company. The container is then put on the manifest of the transport, ship, plane ,train etc. The Customs then have a computerised list for every container and what it contains. Each container seal can then be visually checked as it is loaded/unloaded.
As most containers are constantly filled and shipped by repeat companies eg. a gearbox made in a plant in one country shipped to an assembly plant in another country, they are lower down on the "suspicious" list than an individual container from a lone shipper. Everything is computerised and does not need a lot of manpower.
Most customs finds nowadays are intelligence led. hope this helps
I understand it, nearly all containers(each one has its own individual number), after they have been packed by an accredited company, have a seal placed on the locks by a certified rep from the company.
And all the employees of those companies are immune to corruption, blackmail, and/or bribery.
Not by a long shot. I'm personally aware of several issues in that regards. But it's better than nothing.
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Association_of_Classification_Societies
On a visit to Australia I spoke to one of their quarrantine people. Cooked / processed shrimp did not attract duty or special attention, raw fish did. She did a spotinspection of a refrigerated container of 'Garlic Prawns' from Thailand. It was packed full of raw unshelled shrimp with a whole bulb of garlic inside the door.
People will always try and game the system.
Most of those containers are either 48 foot or 53 foot containers.
Actually no. Sixty percent of them are twenty and forty foot containers coming from overseas. The containers you're speaking of were primarily designed for overland shipping to and from Canadian and Mexican borders.
https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/114th-congress-2015-2016/reports/51478-Shipping-Containers-OneCol.pdf
As of 2016, there were ~32,876 containers entering US sea ports daily. Adding in the land based containers would punch that number up to ~41,000 or so.
All containers are currently scanned for radiation, with five percent of them imaged.
If you read the linked CBO report, you'll see congress got the bright idea to image every container at their port of origin back in 2007. So far, the implementation hasn't happened as the morons in Congress had no clue what they were doing or asking for.
https://www.rapiscan-ase.com/resource-center/technology/z-backscatter
Even with technology like that, they've not gotten above ten percent scanned in any one day. The average is five percent plus risk based scans. The reality is, they can't even manage the scans so they try to push off the responsibility on foreign ports.
That's just for imaging.
To manually inspect each container would require every container be unloaded, every box within that container opened, and every package within that box examined. It would take more than two hours on average just for the unpacking and packing back up of boxes etc. That's before we get to any inspection.
A realistic average number per container for 100% manual search would be four hours with a minimum of four people. Some would be less than an hour, some would be a couple of days. That also assumes any machinery isn't broken down to inspect the internals.
That's 526,027 manhours per day on average. The US cannot manage the much reduced manhours of remote scanning as it is. They sure as hell won't be able to manage 100% manual inspections. No amount of rubbing your favorite congress critters belly would make it so either.
how difficult
Pretty much physically impossible. I've had too many years experience effectively doing that.
Presuming the load is palletized, meaning it's on a four foot pallet - I can and have pulled everything out of a 40' shipping container and stacked it on a loading dock in about 20 minutes. That's just pull the skids out, stick them to the side, because we KNOW the part we're looking for is in the front of the container. Then you grab the one box in the front of the container that has the bolts you need, then it's 30 to 40 minutes loading the trailer back up. (Loading is always tougher than unloading, especially with stacked pallets.)
For purposes of example, you have a mixed skid come in of machine parts and hardware. You may have 200 small boxes, and if those boxes are sealed, there is NO way to check what's in them without opening each and every one of them, and comparing it to the shipping label on the outside. We had screw-ups in the car plant where a box got mislabeled at the sending factory in Japan, and the only reason we caught it was because when we cut the box open to deliver it, we knew what the part was supposed to look like.
And sometimes we didn't, which meant lineside ran out of parts, thus necessitating the 20 minute shutdown while we dug into a container as I said above.
It sounds good to say you want to do something like this, but, as every dead tree novel that exists, going back to Tom Clancy's novels where they talk about it, you realize that there's not enough manpower to do it. Period.
It sounds good to say you want to do something like this, but, as every dead tree novel that exists, going back to Tom Clancy's novels where they talk about it, you realize that there's not enough manpower to do it. Period.
Granted. The numbers here essentially bear that out. But, then, it really begs a question, and it's one that has bedeviled me for a long, long time. If it's so easy to get past the security, why hasn't a chemical or biological terrorist attack materialized? And I'm not going to go all tin-hat-conspriracy suggesting the Kung Flu is such an attack. But why hasn't one happened? What's stopping it?
I gotta think there is more underlying than meets the eye. But it bugs the hell out of me not knowing.
If it's so easy to get past the security, why hasn't a chemical or biological terrorist attack materialized? And I'm not going to go all tin-hat-conspriracy suggesting the Kung Flu is such an attack. But why hasn't one happened? What's stopping it?
I think there are several factors here.
1. Availability and practicality.
The truly high legality chemical agents are hard to get in any quantity, hard to manufacture and dangerous to handle for the user.
On top of that, while the theoretical toxicity of some of the agents out there is so high, that a few pounds could kill millions of people, the experience of the use of chemical weapons in WWII and even more recently is that the effectiveness in actual field use is orders of magnitude below the theoretical toxicity assuming efficient distribution in a closed space.
All of that applies double for bio-weapons.
Really, if terrorists wanted to use a bio weapon, once you have access to suicide bombers, it's easier to infect one of your own people and get him on a flight to a major international airport.
2. It's not just breaching security on the sending end. You have to do it again on the receiving end to retrieve your weapon.
It's not like it's simple to get a shipping container packed up and sent internationally to a residential address. And if you could, that would probably be a huge red flag that would get your container extra special attention from customs services in every country it passes through.
3. The law of conspiracies. In general, the probability of any conspiracy either succeeding or remaining secret is inversely proportional to the number of conspirators.
Chemical and biological weapons require labor intensive specialized skilled handling. This would require a very large conspiracy unless the conspirators are suicidal.
Chemical and biological weapons require labor intensive specialized skilled handling. This would require a very large conspiracy unless the conspirators are suicidal.
That's part of what bothers me as that level of fanaticism was already demonstrated on 9/11. As far as manufacturing such weapons, I have to think that if someone such as Saddam Hussein was able to engineer a chemical weapons program, it wouldn't be hard for Iran to do the same. Same for biological. That leaves only getting it through the ports.
Maybe our intelligence agencies aren't as inept as they sometimes demonstrate? That's one explanation. But like I said, not knowing is what's driving me bats.
As far as manufacturing such weapons, I have to think that if someone such as Saddam Hussein was able to engineer a chemical weapons program, it wouldn't be hard for Iran to do the same.
Now you are talking about having a nation/state involved, not a terrorist organization.
It's one thing for a terrorist organization to do suicide attacks. National governments generally don't do that.
As far as Iran, Iraq and Syria go, If the public support and political will was there to do it, we could obliterate all three of them*.
If we were actually hit with a chemical or bio weapon and we had evidence of direct involvement of one of those governments the public support and political will to do it would materialize.
My opinion, the only Nation with a ruler crazy enough to go there is North Korea.
Now, if Iraq, Iran, or Syria was to just give chemical or biological weapons to a terrorist organization they would still have the issue of having to handle it without wiping themselves out before getting it here.
*I'm not talking about trying to occupy them and engage in nation building. Just crush them until they are reduced to a pre-industrial state and walk the fuck away.
a nation/state involved, not a terrorist organization.
That's the big point. A terrorist organization is presumably backed by a nation/state, and we've seen that in the past. The problem is, if the terrorist organization goes too far, then the sponsoring nation/state will be held liable for their actions.
Another thing that Clancy got right is our response, which would be to respond in kind. A bug is a gas is a nuke. You hit us with a gas attack, we'd respond with a gas attack - except we don't have gas, we have nukes. The other detail is that, while the war gases are deadly, it doesn't take much to block them. Their primary use in combat isn't to kill an enemy soldier, it's to reduce his effectiveness, by forcing him to operate in MOPP gear.
1. Availability and practicality.
The truly high legality chemical agents are hard to get in any quantity, hard to manufacture and dangerous to handle for the user.
Which isn't to mention unshielded radioactive materials can be detected from miles away. While Shielded radioactive materials have characteristics which would tend to draw attention towards them, and would certainly stick out like a sore thumb in imaging.
Chem/Bio attack systems would also stick out like a sore thumb in an imaging system. Which isn't to mention that "sniffers" could possibly detect some of them if you don't perfectly seal everything.
And the law of conspiracies thing also applies. It would take a lot of specialized people to make it happen. And the act of bringing in that many specialists would draw attention to your activities, which means your stuff is likely to get special attention anyway...
Which isn't to mention unshielded radioactive materials can be detected from miles away. While Shielded radioactive materials have characteristics which would tend to draw attention towards them, and would certainly stick out like a sore thumb in imaging.
Chem/Bio attack systems would also stick out like a sore thumb in an imaging system. Which isn't to mention that "sniffers" could possibly detect some of them if you don't perfectly seal everything.
Detecting ionizing radiation at the range of miles depends heavily on the nature of it. In particular, Nuetron emitters have the longest range. The gamma/x electromagnetic frequencies are still subject to the inverse square law, attenuation, absorption etc. The source would have to be strong enough to kill anyone in the immediate vicinity to be detected miles away for the EM variant (ETA a few PBq of Co60 for instance). Cutting edge science has the distance for EM radiation detection at one kilometer, not miles, and even that is not yet out of the lab.
https://www.nature.com/articles/ncomms15394?WT.mc_id=FBK_NCOMMS_1705_ELECTROMAGNETICRADIATION_OA
Free nuetron particles can be detected much further away. However, short of nuclear fission, fusion, or a very high powered accelerator, you won't be seeing their source until you've already got bigger fish to fry.
Regarding the biologics, imaging is a poor choice for their detection.
https://www.npr.org/2020/01/28/800559393/harvard-chemistry-professor-arrested-and-accused-of-lying-about-ties-to-china
The guy attempting to get the materials out was first caught by intelligence, not by imaging. He further screwed up by wrapping several vials in a sock. Had the Feds not already had him tagged, and if it was a vial singular, he could have went through security either way without raising an eyebrow. The volume inside a AA battery casing is sufficient to sneak out or in a bio weapon.
As for the chemical variant, powdered or gas makes a huge difference. As I mentioned before in this thread, gas can be problematic. Nerve agents of a size large enough to cause mayhem but not mass deaths can be snuck in, but powdered materials is another story. When the power's that be can stop the flow of nose candy, then it might be possible to stop the other.
Regarding the biologics, imaging is a poor choice for their detection.
It's not the raw biologics Not_a_ID was thinking of being spotted on imaging, but a delivery/dispersal device. An actual bio-weapon, not just raw virus samples.
There are much easier ways to smuggle vials of virus samples than in a shipping container. An actual complete bio-weapon would be different.
I think it unlikely that terrorists interested in a bio attack on the US would smuggle in raw virus and then try to build the weapon here. Building the weapon is the part that requires the most specialized knowledge. Doing that here maximizes the odds that they will be caught before it's deployed.
The volume inside a AA battery casing is sufficient to sneak out or in a bio weapon.
Virus or bacteria samples for espionage, sure, but those aren't by themselves actual weapons. And that wouldn't be enough quantity for an actual weapon. then you need bio reactors and yet more specialists here to grow more virus.
It's not the raw biologics Not_a_ID was thinking of being spotted on imaging, but a delivery/dispersal device. An actual bio-weapon, not just raw virus samples.
There are much easier ways to smuggle vials of virus samples than in a shipping container. An actual complete bio-weapon would be different.
I think it unlikely that terrorists interested in a bio attack on the US would smuggle in raw virus and then try to build the weapon here. Building the weapon is the part that requires the most specialized knowledge. Doing that here maximizes the odds that they will be caught before it's deployed.
Exactly.
It's not the raw biologics Not_a_ID was thinking of being spotted on imaging, but a delivery/dispersal device. An actual bio-weapon, not just raw virus samples.
The device itself I can agree with. It would stand out.
Virus or bacteria samples for espionage, sure, but those aren't by themselves actual weapons. And that wouldn't be enough quantity for an actual weapon. then you need bio reactors and yet more specialists here to grow more virus.
No they are not a weapon by themselves. At least not until a suicidal fanatic infects themselves with it and begins traipsing around the local market or other high density population areas. No bioreactor or specialist required.
At least not until a suicidal fanatic infects themselves with it and begins traipsing around the local market or other high density population areas.
Except if they are going to go that route, the most likely approach is to infect a suicidal fanatic at home and put him on a flight into a major international airport.
Except if they are going to go that route, the most likely approach is to infect a suicidal fanatic at home and put him on a flight into a major international airport.
What is your basis for that being most likely?
What is your basis for that being most likely?
1. It eliminates the need to smuggle vials of virus into a western nation.
2. You are exposing large groups of travelers, mid travel, so it spreads faster, ultimately exposes more people.
ETA: If I were going to do something like that, it seems to me to be the most efficient way to infect/kill the largest number of people.
1. It eliminates the need to smuggle vials of virus into a western nation.
2. You are exposing large groups of travelers, mid travel, so it spreads faster, ultimately exposes more people.
ETA: If I were going to do something like that, it seems to me to be the most efficient way to infect/kill the largest number of people.
All of which assumes the intent is to kill the world. That intent is highly unlikely as if everyone dies, whatever the message was intended to be becomes a moot point.
All of which assumes the intent is to kill the world. That intent is highly unlikely as if everyone dies, whatever the message was intended to be becomes a moot point.
I disagree. I think it's perfectly logical to impute such intent to anyone who would resort to a bio weapon.
I disagree. I think it's perfectly logical to impute such intent to anyone who would resort to a bio weapon.
We'll have to agree to disagree on that point then. Logical btw, is not something I'd apply to anyone insane enough to do something like that either way.
Logical btw, is not something I'd apply to anyone insane enough to do something like that either way.
It's not about them thinking logically, but about what we can logically deduce about their motives.
I think it's perfectly logical to impute such intent to anyone who would resort to a bio weapon.
The only way to do so would be if the nation/state that sent out the bio weapon in the first place had created an antidote or vaccine for it.
The ones that are actually loony enough to want to kill everyone, INCLUDING themselves, are the true hardcore environmentalists, that believe the planet would be better off without man at all.
The ones that are actually loony enough to want to kill everyone, INCLUDING themselves, are the true hardcore environmentalists, that believe the planet would be better off without man at all.
Or crazy enough to think their deity will protect them, or they will be able to use precautions to protect their "chosen people" while the contagion is dangerous.
Or crazy enough to think their deity will protect them
Overheard yesterday: "He sent the virus as a lesson because we've stopped believing in Him. I believe so He'll protect me."
AJ
Overheard yesterday: "He sent the virus as a lesson because we've stopped believing in Him. I believe so He'll protect me."
There are variations of that across all major religions.
Overheard yesterday: "He sent the virus as a lesson because we've stopped believing in Him. I believe so He'll protect me."
A satanist probably would state nearly the same: "He sent the virus as a lesson because we've stopped believing in Him. I believe so Hell'll protect me."
HM.
The fanaticism is there, the means are there, the will was pretty much broken after the Gulf wars. It cost them too much when it was all said and done.
Everyone, including the terrorists and those funding them, had lessons learned. For the terrorist, it was big flashy attacks like 911 awoke the proverbial dragon. For those attacked, the lesson learned was when you squeezed them too hard, they leaked out and splintered.
Now the approach is that of the "The Mice in Council." Their so called leaders chase after the mice until one is found to be fanatical enough to ignore how dangerous the cat is.
If they could find a way to bring down the west in one shot, they would. However, simply belling the cat won't do that. They need the cat dead instantly. Therefore there has been no further attack on the scale of 911. In the mean time, they make a slice here, and one there, in hopes the adage "death by a thousand cuts" works out.
I'll check with Rick Jackson, you know he invented them. Apologies to Red McLean.
The Conex container. This was tongue in cheek. I had Rick invent it Book 5 of the Richard Jackson Saga. In RL Red Mclean of Mclean Trucking invented them.
Rick
"rick noun
Λrik
Definition of rick (Entry 1 of 3)
1: a stack (as of hay) in the open air
2: a pile of material (such as cordwood) split from short logs
rick verb (1)
ricked; ricking; ricks
Definition of rick (Entry 2 of 3)
transitive verb
: to pile (something, such as hay) in ricks
rick verb (2)
ricked; ricking; ricks
Definition of rick (Entry 3 of 3)
transitive verb
chiefly British
: WRENCH, SPRAIN
First Known Use of rick
Noun
before the 12th century, in the meaning defined at sense 1
Verb (1)
1623, in the meaning defined above
Verb (2)
1638, in the meaning defined above
History and Etymology for rick
Noun
Middle English reek, from Old English hrΔac; akin to Old Norse hraukr rick
Verb (2)
perhaps from Middle English wrikken to move unsteadily"
Rick is WRONG! His name is Richard, which is a perfect name for a man, it includes rich and hard.
Rick is WRONG! His name is Richard, which is a perfect name for a man
Codswallop!
'Rick' is a man's man. 'Casablanca' would have been dreadful if the protagonist had been called 'Richard'. ;)
AJ