Chapter 1: A Longer Road

And so, my fellow Americans: ask not what your country can do for you — ask what you can do for your country.

My fellow citizens of the world: ask not what America will do for you, but what together we can do for the freedom of man.

John F. Kennedy’s Inaugural Address

As we wound down from the Cuban Missile Crisis, I alone was aware of the challenges of the future. JFK, in his Inaugural Address, asked some very relevant question. To answer them, we needed not just a stirring slogan as a vision, but a strategy. We needed to guide the Administration into a longer view.

“The real question which confronts us, therefore, is how much are we ourselves prepared to put into Southeast Asia and for how long in order to serve such interests as we may have in that region?

Senator Mike Mansfield

Report to President Kennedy

December 1962

In particular, I wanted the clan to consider avoiding U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia. You may not have learned it in your history classes, unless they were specialized ones, but there were interactions between the Cuban Missile Crisis and the early American combat involvement in Southeast Asia. “Southeast Asia” is more precise than “Vietnam War”, as the U.S. perception in 1959 was that the major coming confrontation would be in Laos, not South Vietnam. We did not fully understand that the North Vietnamese government had, in January 1959, decided for a military solution in South Vietnam, establishing the 559th Transportation Group, in May 1959, to run the Ho Chi Minh Trail infiltration infrastructure.

Learning the backgropund

In the secure meeting room, after drinks and snacks were available, I started to talk. “When the Kennedy Administration took office, they had a strong interest in covert operations, ala Ian Fleming’s James Bond in most cases. Roger Hilsman, the Assistant Secretary of State who headed State Department intelligence, was the only senior official who had actual experience as a guerrilla, but he was outside the inner circle. They soon discovered, however, that CIA paramilitary assets were fully committed to the invasion of Cuba, which would become known as the Bay of Pigs. Under Eisenhower, that invasion was much larger, and involved more American resources, than the eventual action in 1961.

Interrupting here, Mr. Kennedy had a fascination with that silly tuxedo, James Bond, not to be confused with me. My secret wars are far more effective. Meow.

“One of the conflicts was between Cuban and Laotian operations.”

Vivian raised a hand. “I don’t have the geography clearly in my head. Is there a map that you can show?”

http://www2.needham.k12.ma.us/nhs/cur/wwII/05/p1-05/wexler-km-p1-5-05/images/vietmap.JPG

Luckily, I had a map of classroom size, and put it on an easel. “I’ll get individual copies. In fact, we need to put together a notebook for everyone -- maybe two versions, one of which can have sensitive notes and doesn’t leave this floor.”

With a bit of a smirk, Lois observed “While it doesn’t seem to be a problem for anyone here, perhaps there should be wider distribution of maps that help people find the clitoris and G-spot. Before you start arguing, I sure as hell have a G-spot.”

“Oh, agreed. With you, it might be most sensitive from the back side, as it were.”

She gave a pretty curtsy. “For that, I thank my Greek heritage.”

“Ahem. Anyway, our Air Force did not have enough airplanes and crew to give full support to Project MILL POND, which would add air support to the ground operation, Project WHITE STAR. Both were intended to have plausible deniability. The crews were to fly “sanitized” (unmarked) B-26 bombers on interdiction missions over Laos, and the CIA most likely was not able to supply them because its contractor and Cuban rebel assets were fully occupied by the the Bay of Pigs operation. the operation. The Air Force and CIA supplied aircrews to Laos, out of uniform and presumably employed by a dummy corporation -- a proprietary airline in CIA’s growing Air Division -- in Thailand. Eisenhower’s original plan had been to support the Cuban operation, in response to an appeal, with overt U.S. aircraft from the aircraft carrier that was just over the horizon during the invasion.

Presidential differences

“The change of Administrations was challenging. Kennedy and Eisenhower had utterly different personalities and backgrounds, and initially despised one another. In foreign policy, they had different approaches to virtually every problem. They did begin to develop respect. It was rumored that Eisenhower called Kennedy “Little Boy Blue” to his staff, while Kennedy referred to Eisenhower as a “shit” and a “cold bastard”.”

Remember, Harold, you cannot refer to what happened to Kennedy in your previous life.

“The former Supreme Commander believed in, and used, the military decisionmaking process using a formal staff and a strong Chief of Staff. During WWII, he had Walter Bedell Smith in that critical role, Smith also serving as hatchetman to allow Ike to have the popular smiling image. During his Administration, he put Adams in that role.

“Kennedy, in contrast, was more of a micromanager, communicating directly with staff experts, and bringing in his personal advisers in ad hoc consultation on many issues. Sometimes, it seemed, he really wanted to use a trusted political aide, such as Kenny O’Donnell or Dave Powers, as a sounding board for his own thinking.”

“His key military adviser, Robert McNamara, had yet another style, derived from statistics and industrial management theory. McNamara did not trust any recommendation that did not have a quantitative justification; he distrusted senior military experience who drew on experience. McNamara, and his closest advisers, Alain Enthoven, an economist, and John McNaughton, a law professor, also expected the opponent to use the same rational processes that they did. It never seemed to occur to them that if the Joint Chiefs approached things differently, why should Ho Chi Minh or Ngo Dinh Diem think as they did?

“So how did the Kennedy Administration start their alternate approach? Let me review events from last year.

January 1961

“Eisenhower had the Laotian covert operation in progress, but the presence in South Vietnam was advisory and logistic. He issued a National Security Action Memorandum dictating that the military to prepare to operate not just against a Korean War-style invasion, but to prepare counterinsurgency forces to fight guerrillas. This immediately caused an internal conflict in the Army, since Army Special Forces -- the “Green Berets”, although that headgear was forbidden at the time -- was the core of counterinsurgency expertise.

“A little afterwards, he told the National Security Council that he did not want only to operate defensively, but to start covert operations to destabilize North Vietnam, broadly like MONGOOSE operations against Cuba.

March 1961

The President was not happy to find that little had progressed in what he now thought of as guerrilla operations against North Vietnam, or, as he inaccurately described it, “Viet Minh territory”. The CIA Station Chief, William Colby, countered that they needed paramilitary resources to meet requirements just in South Vietnam.

April 1961

Kennedy directed a presidential task force to draft a “Program of Action for Vietnam”. These directions, however, did not address the strategic reasons for such action, only operational requirements.

“Why not,” asked Terry?

I’m afraid my response was cynical. “What? Define the problem first? No! Do something!” I imitated Kennedy’s Boston accent. “Act with vigah! Be vigahrous!”

She understood the reference. “Vigor is best when employed for athletic and compatible partners engaged in energetic fucking. I don’t find it especially useful when I’m in dominatrix mode, so I wonder if it’s relevant to diplomacy.”